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INTRODUCTION
Who should govern cyberspace?  And what rules should apply?
When Professor Louise Weinberg invited us to contribute to this sym-
posium, she asked us to write on governance issues in the new frontier
of cyberspace.  That could have been a daunting task.  The electronic
world we live in today presents many challenges.  Fortunately, cyber-
space is no longer new, and many before us have attacked the broad
governance questions that arise when persons all over the world com-
municate and transact business using the global Internet.1  As a result,
we need not tackle those larger questions; rather, we will discuss what
the Supreme Court’s recent imposition of territorial limits in various
† Professor, Widener University School of Law.
†† Jacob A. France Professor of Judicial Process, University of Maryland Francis King
Carey School of Law. Thanks to Wil Marchica, Maryland Law School class of 2014, for
research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Dawn C. Nunziato, Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms, and Internet Gov-
ernance, 52 EMORY L.J. 187, 192–93, 196–214 (2003) (examining the impact of the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers’ authority over the Internet’s infrastructure
on free speech); Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture
and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 815 (2004) (identifying the fundamental ques-
tion of Internet governance as “whether and how the architecture of the Internet should
affect the shape and content of legal regulation of the global network of networks”).
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areas of law means to disputes that arise from interactions that take
place electronically.  Rather than discussing who should govern cyber-
space, we will focus on the question of whose rules should apply.
Our assigned task implies that the frontiers of cyberspace differ
from the frontiers of the tangible world.  In one sense, that is true: the
Internet is a global “network of networks,” enabled by the Transfer
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), which allows any com-
puter in the world to communicate with any other computer in the
world.2  On the other hand, however, the interactions conducted over
this global network have tangible world effects that are often no differ-
ent from the pre-Internet era tangible world effects of tangible world
activities.  This is true regardless of the number of exotic jurisdictions
through which electronic information may pass on its journey from
point A to point B.
So what insight do we have concerning who should govern cyber-
space?  We propose a simple framework.  At the core of that frame-
work is our recognition that the term “cyberspace” refers to a means
of communication.  This means of communication allows individuals
and entities to engage in the same interactions using electronics in
which they engage in the face-to-face world.  Cyberspace, as a method
of communication, in other words, removes spatial constraints from
these interactions.  Therefore, persons can interact at no additional
cost with others located in far-flung jurisdictions.  Does the removal of
cost and spatial constraints change the legal nature of the interaction?
Our framework separates the substance of the interaction from
the method of communication.  Most cyberspace problems are not
unique to this century.  As Debora Spar wrote in 2001, “[c]yberspace
is indeed a brave new world, but it’s not the only new world.”3  In past
centuries, telegraphy4 and radio5 were similarly transformative tech-
nologies in that they allowed the instantaneous, or almost instantane-
ous, transmission of content to geographically far-flung recipients.
Courts experienced little or no difficulty—at least as seen from this
distance—when dealing with the new technology.  Is there anything
about cyberspace that makes it different?
We acknowledge that this history of technology and cyberspace is
one step in the evolution of communications technology.  Therefore,
2 Solum & Chung, supra note 1, at 821. See MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: R
INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE 6 (2004).
3 DEBORA L. SPAR, RULING THE WAVES: CYCLES OF DISCOVERY, CHAOS, AND WEALTH
FROM THE COMPASS TO THE INTERNET 3 (2001).
4 See id. at 62 (describing telegraphy as a “more dramatic” innovation than today’s
Internet because it “made irrelevant distances that had once seemed unbreachable, and
widened the perspective of nearly all the world’s people”).
5 See id. at 125 (attributing the power of radio to its “inherent capacity . . . to send a
single message across a wide and unidentified audience”).
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in the first instance, we view cyberspace problems as common
problems that the law—both statutory and judge-made—has had cen-
turies to deal with, understand, and resolve.  Under our framework,
that hard-won collective wisdom should be displaced only if the world
of cyberspace creates a world different not only in technology but also
in concept.  In other words, is there something fundamentally differ-
ent about cyberspace so that it creates qualitatively different legal
problems?  It is only when that happens that cyberspace-specific solu-
tions should be adopted.
Finally, we have asked if American courts have been “territorial”
in their approach to either multistate or international problems.  We
have then asked, if so, whether that territorial approach makes sense.
The short answer is that American courts have not gone out of
their way to assume control over these problems.  Rather, the prefer-
ence has been to use well-established precedents to resolve situations.
In other words, American courts have overtly deferred to American
law in cyberspace transactions only when fundamental American is-
sues—such as free speech—are at stake.  Our courts have shown little
appetite for neo-territorialism, unless something vital to our own in-
terests is involved.  That is not a complete answer, however, for it does
not answer the question whether those precedents lead to overly terri-
torial results.  Alas, that too is beyond the scope of this Essay.
In this short Essay, we cannot possibly address all governance
problems in cyberspace.  In the early days of cyberlaw scholarship,
Judge Frank Easterbrook asked whether cyberspace law was just “the
law of the horse.”6  His point was that just as any attempt to gather all
of the cases involving horses into a law of the horse was “doomed to be
shallow and to miss unifying principles,”7 so too might an attempt to
isolate a discipline called cyberspace law.  We heed this warning, and
in this Essay we reflect on the effect that electronic communications
has had on the substantive areas of law about which we teach and
write.  We have chosen not to consider issues involving governmental
eavesdropping—solutions, if any, to those problems can come only at
the national, or perhaps, international level.  What we do address are
issues common to everyday life—contracts, jurisdiction, choice of law,
taxation, and some torts, including defamation and privacy.  All of
these questions raise governance issues; they do not, however, tell us
on their face who should control cyberspace.
6 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207,
208.
7 Id. at 207.
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I
A NOTE ON THE PAST
Twenty years ago, many argued that cyberspace presented a dif-
ferent legal environment.8  One well-known screed by John Perry Bar-
low, the former Grateful Dead lyricist who cofounded the Electronic
Frontier Foundation,9 put it this way: “[cyberspace] is a world that is
both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live.”10  Bar-
low went on to proclaim that the tangible world concepts of “property,
expression, identity, movement, and context” do not apply in cyber-
space.11  He was not alone; many proclaimed the dawning of a new
age, where different rules—or maybe no rules—would control.  The
feeling of a new era became compounded when litigation inevitably
arose where at least one party would contend that the old rules should
no longer apply.12
These proclamations were based on the faulty premise that cyber-
space was a new world, unlike any other.  The word “cyberspace” itself
encourages adoption of this premise, strongly implying that this mode
of interaction is in fact a place.  Although the original author of the
term, cyberpunk author William Gibson, denounced it as an “‘evoca-
tive and essentially meaningless’ buzzword,”13 “cyberspace” became
the preferred term for talking about and analyzing all things elec-
tronic.14  As a result, some courts and commentators started to ap-
proach issues involving interactions conducted electronically as
though the fact of their electronic genesis needed a whole new analy-
sis of the harm or transaction.15  Other commentators, however, ap-
proached Internet regulation not on a transaction or interaction basis
8 See infra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Commen- R
tary, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 505–11 (1999)
(arguing that cyberspace has an “architectural feature” that complicates legal regulation
and noting that some scholars believe that regulation is impossible).
9 See BARLOW HOME(STEAD) PAGE, https://homes.eff.org/~barlow/ (last visited July
14, 2014).
10 John P. Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, BARLOW HOME(STEAD)
PAGE (Feb. 8, 1996), https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
11 Id.
12 The new world was full of money-making opportunities; it was not as innocent as
Barlow and others thought.  Squabbling over money leads to litigation.
13 Scott Thill, March 17, 1948: William Gibson, Father of Cyberspace, WIRED, Mar. 17,
2009, http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2009/03/dayintech_0317.
14 See, e.g., Cyber Glossary, NAT’L INITIATIVE FOR CYBERSECURITY CAREERS & STUDIES, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://niccs.us-cert.gov/glossary#letter_c (last visited Mar. 15,
2014) (defining “cyberspace” as “[t]he interdependent network of information technology
infrastructures, that includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer sys-
tems, and embedded processors and controllers”).
15 See, e.g., Danielle K. Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private
Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 295 (2007) (arguing that
“[o]ur conception of injury must undergo change in the twenty-first century”).
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but on an architecture basis,16 and they proposed Internet govern-
ance regimes that took the Internet’s architecture into account.  Prob-
ably the most prominent of these commentators was Lawrence Lessig,
who argued that the greatest challenge in regulating cyberspace was
how to make sense of the “software and hardware that make each
cyber-space the way it is.”17
Things eventually sorted themselves out, however.  When faced
with questions involving the Internet, the judges did what they have
been trained to do and embarked on a search for analogy.  To be
sure, that took some effort, and it was some time before courts began
to feel comfortable in opining on the new world that was opening
before them.  That is very clear (and understandable).  Opinions writ-
ten fifteen or twenty years ago showed an earnest attempt by judges to
understand the Internet and how it works in modern life.18  Those
opinions are quite touching when read in retrospect;19 although the
judges showed their good faith attempts to understand the new tech-
nology, they often got it wrong.  Eventually, however, both the judges
and their clerks came to understand things better, and today the
world of electronic interactions has become very well settled.
A number of scholars took somewhat longer to realize these
truths.  Perhaps that is because novelty has a premium in academic
life: status there depends much more on new ideas rather than on
clarifying old truths.  It is much better for a professor’s career to cre-
ate new concepts, no matter how wrong-headed, than to say that the
old law got all of this right.20  In short, for many professors, novelty
trumps analysis.  Although that predilection for novelty led to many
wrong turns in dealing with problems involving electronic transac-
tions,21 the courts eventually got it right.  Litigation today involving
16 An “architecture basis” assumed that the structure of the Internet might by itself
require a separate analysis. But see Lessig, supra note 8, at 505–06 & n.13 (criticizing argu- R
ments that the nature of cyberspace eliminates the government’s capacity to regulate).
17 Id. at 503.
18 For example, consider a line of cases in which various courts attempt to analyze
types and levels of Internet activity that are sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. See,
e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (regularly sending elec-
tronic files); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996)
(maintaining advertisements on a website); Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (posting information on a website); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.
Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (forwarding advertisements and encouraging the use of an
electronic mailing list).
19 Perhaps the most touching of all these attempts is Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com,
Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997), where the judge tries so very hard to understand
the Internet and yet manages to mangle the law badly.
20 We discuss this problem in more detail in Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reyn-
olds, From Lord Coke to Internet Privacy: The Past, Present, and Future of Electronic Contracting, 72
MD. L. REV. 452 (2013).
21 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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electronic transactions is virtually indistinguishable from that involv-
ing old-fashioned paper contracts.22
That is not our approach in this Essay.  We contend that centuries
of legal experience have provided ample guidance to deal with most
issues.  It is only when the new world provides us with unique
problems that new solutions need to be found.  In the world of poten-
tial cyberspace governance, lines of demarcation of authority have
long been laid out and are well understood.  That understanding can
be traced to the opinion by Justice Curtis in Cooley v. Board of War-
dens23 where the Court recognized that some problems required a na-
tional solution, some demanded a local solution, and many could be
handled at either level.24
Similarly, in the electronic world, the real question becomes
whether there is something so special about that world that renders
the long-settled rules in the area no longer relevant.  Basically, that
leaves us with two issues: first, those concerning the technical struc-
ture of the electronic world, and second, issues involving the perma-
nence and unlimited range of electronic transactions.  With regard to
the latter, we mean that electronic transactions can occur anyplace in
the world and they have the potential to last forever.
II
THE NEW TERRITORIALISM AND CYBERSPACE
The topic of this symposium is the “new territorialism” displayed
by the Supreme Court in decisions such as Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro-
leum25 and Morrison v. National Australia Bank.26  In those cases, the
Court applied a canon of statutory interpretation that provides that a
statute has no extraterritorial application unless it gives a clear indica-
tion that such an application should be found.27  The presumption
“rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily legislates with re-
spect to domestic, not foreign matters.”28  We were asked to write
about cyberspace, so the question we explore is this: Where does activ-
ity in cyberspace take place under Kiobel and Morrison?
Here, it is helpful to refine what we mean when we talk about
cyberspace.  Despite John Perry Barlow’s proclamation that cyber-
22 See Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 20, at 457–58 & n.31. R
23 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
24 See id. at 319; see generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 11.4 (5th ed. 2012) (explaining the
Cooley doctrine).
25 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
26 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
27 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877–78.
28 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
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space is “everywhere and nowhere,”29 cyberspace is not a place.  Nor is
it a thing.  Instead, cyberspace is a collection of networks comprised of
physical components such as wires and cables, and digital components
such as software and transport protocols, which allow the content gen-
erated by persons using computers connected to the Internet to flow
through the network.30
On the one hand, cyberspace is a method of communication.
When we send an e-mail message or post an update to Facebook, our
communication is facilitated by cyberspace.  When cyberspace func-
tions only as a method of communication between two entities, there
may be little reason to treat cyberspace any differently from how we
treat the telephone.31
Cyberspace, however, is also a method of advertising, both in the
traditional sense, as when a company establishes a web page that view-
ers all over the world can see, and in the informal sense, as when an
individual posts an update to Facebook or to Twitter.  In the advertis-
ing sense, cyberspace gives actors a worldwide presence.  Is that world-
wide presence enough to invite the reach of the laws of myriad
jurisdictions?  The answer is “maybe.”  Below, we discuss the problem
of collecting sales tax in online transactions.  There, we make an argu-
ment that the answer is “yes.”  But that should not always be the case,
and the last paragraph of the Kiobel opinion reminds us that cyber-
space is not the only facilitator of worldwide transactions.32
A corporation, unlike cyberspace, is a defined legal entity.  But
like cyberspace, and unlike natural persons, a corporation can have a
worldwide presence.  Corporate presence is more definable than
cyberspace presence; in order for a corporation to be “present” in a
jurisdiction, it must be doing something there through its agents and
physical presence, or someone must register it in the jurisdiction.33  In
Kiobel, Chief Justice Roberts reminds us that although corporations
can be present in many jurisdictions, “it would reach too far to say that
mere corporate presence suffices” to defeat the presumption against
extraterritoriality.34  The same rule should apply to interactions con-
ducted over the Internet.  If the interaction truly takes place “every-
where and nowhere,” it may need to be regulated in an Internet-
29 Barlow, supra note 10. R
30 See Solum & Chung, supra note 1, at 816–17 (explaining the different layers of the R
Internet “[v]iewed as a system of communication between users”).
31 One difference is that e-mail messages can be stored at virtually no cost.
32 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
33 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2012) (allowing an entity to file for bankruptcy in the
district in which it has its domicile, principal place of business, or principal assets); U.C.C.
§ 9-307 (stating that the location of a registered organization is the state in which it is
organized).
34 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
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unique way.  If the interaction is one that would have the same impact
if conducted over the phone or by a fax machine, then it probably
does not require a unique regulatory mechanism.
On the other hand, the Internet raises several unique questions.
Some arise from the architecture of the Internet.  We address one of
those issues, that of Internet domain names, in the next section.
Others arise from the advertising nature of the Internet.  The tele-
phone is a communication device, but a telephone conversation trans-
mits information to a finite number of persons in known jurisdictions.
The Internet is different because it conveys information to an infinite
number of persons across the globe.  It is easy to argue that the mere
existence of information on a web page gives the effect of that infor-
mation worldwide ramifications.  Certainly that is the approach taken
in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme (LICRA),35
which we discuss below.
We do not discuss issues where national (or international) treat-
ment is clearly appropriate.  The most obvious of such areas involve
electronic eavesdropping,36 but there are many others, which space
does not permit us to talk about.
III
HOW DO I FIND YOU IF YOU ARE EVERYWHERE
AND NOWHERE?
Telephones allow persons all over the world to communicate di-
rectly with one another.  In order to do so, each person connected
with a phone must have a phone number.  In the days of landlines,
the responsibility for distributing phone numbers was easily assigned.
Phone numbers had some relationship to physical location.  One per-
son could have the number 555-1212 in Washington, D.C., and an-
other could have the same number in New York City, because those
two locations had two different area codes.  On the other hand, no
two persons could have the same number with the same area code.  As
mobile phones proliferated, the phone numbers, at least in the
United States, remained tied to geography.
Just as one can reach a telephone customer only by using her
unique identifier, one can find an entity on the Internet by using its
unique identifier.  On the Internet, this identifier is the domain
35 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (en banc).
36 Electronic eavesdropping is normally associated with governmental snooping.  The
resolution of those issues is clearly beyond the authority of national courts applying na-
tional territorial-based law. See Charlie Savage & James Risen, Latest Release of Documents on
N.S.A. Includes 2004 Ruling on Email Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/11/19/us/latest-release-of-documents-on-nsa-includes-2004-ruling-on-
email-surveillance.html.
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name.37  Many domain names are “everywhere and nowhere.”  A
holder of a domain name in the “.com”-level domain can be located
anywhere in the world, but often the name sends no signal about its
holder’s geographical location.38  Domain names require an interna-
tional regime for two reasons, one related to Internet technology and
the other related to Internet impact.
The technology reason is this: a domain name is a unique, world-
wide identifier.  In the physical world people can distinguish United
Airlines from United Van Lines.  They cannot both be known as
“united.com” on the Internet, however.39  Because every web address
must translate to a unique computer, the assignment of web addresses
in the Domain Name System (DNS) must be, and is, managed by a
central authority.40
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) was created in 1998.41  ICANN replaced the U.S. govern-
ment as the sole assignor of domain names on the Internet.42  It
should be quite clear that one and only one authority can control the
assignment of domain names.  Not only has ICANN done that well in
the past, but it recently expanded greatly (for better or worse) the
galaxy of available top-level domain names.43
The Internet technology that led to worldwide domain names
created a clash among trademark regimes.  Domain names often in-
corporate trademarks, and because domain name registrars do not vet
domain name requests before granting them, it is easy for someone
other than a trademark holder to register a mark.44  In the early days
37 Juliet M. Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names to Enforce Judgments: Looking Back to Look
to the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 95 (2003) (“A domain name is the identifier used by
individuals to find specific web sites.”).
38 Of course, many domain names are country specific. See Paul Sloan, Staking A
Claim On Domains Beyond Dot-Com, CNNMoney (Aug. 29, 2006, 10:45 AM), http://money.
cnn.com/2006/08/29/technology/nextbigforeign.biz2/.
39 See Moringiello, supra note 37, at 119. R
40 Anupam Chander analogizes the DNS to a worldwide property registry. See
ANUPAM CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SILK ROAD: HOW THE WEB BINDS THE WORLD IN COM-
MERCE 110 (2013).
41 Id.
42 Registrar Accreditation: History of the Shared Registry System, ICANN, http://www.icann.
org/en/resources/registrars/accreditation/history (last visited July 14, 2014).  The U.S.
government retained oversight of ICANN but announced in March 2014 that it would
relinquish its control of the organization.  Gautham Nagesh, U.S. Plans to Give Up Oversight
of Web Domain Manager, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2014, 7:01 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702303546204579439653103639452.
43 See New Generic Top-Level Domains, ICANN, http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/about/
program (last visited July 14, 2014) (explaining ICANN’s process for introducing new ge-
neric top-level domains).  Top-level domains include “.com,” “.net,” and “.edu.”  Generic
top-level domains are those that are not restricted to residents of a particular country.
Moringiello, supra note 37, at 97–98. R
44 See Moringiello, supra note 37, at 100 (“The registrar does not inquire as to whether R
anyone else has trademark rights in the name.”).
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of the Internet, it was common for cybersquatters to register the
names of large companies in order to try to coerce those companies
into paying for a transfer of the name.45  Because these problems are
felt worldwide, ICANN implemented the Uniform Domain Name Res-
olution Policy (UDRP), a policy to which all domain name registrants
must agree.46  The UDRP requires that domain name registrants
agree to arbitrate any claims that the name infringes on the rights of a
trademark holder.47  By implementing the UDRP, ICANN, an Ameri-
can entity, has regulatory authority over all domain name registrants
in the top-level domains in ICANN’s control.48
Even domain names cannot truly be “everywhere and nowhere,”
however.  Someone in a physical location must have the power to
identify and regulate those names.  Congress recognized this fact in
enacting the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).49
The birth of the World Wide Web and the Domain Name System gave
rise to a form of wrongdoing that was unique to cyberspace: cyber-
squatting.  Cybersquatters reserved high-profile domain names such as
“eddiebauer.com” and “neiman-marcus.com,” hoping to sell them for
a high price to the holders of the trademarks incorporated in the
names.50  Many of these domain name registrants used fictitious
names and addresses or registered the domain names in the name of
offshore companies, in an attempt to evade jurisdiction.51
To address the cybersquatting problem, Congress gave domain
names a situs and provided for in rem jurisdiction over them.52  Under
the ACPA, an aggrieved trademark holder may bring an in rem action
against a domain name in the judicial district in which the domain
name registrar or registry is located.53  This makes sense—intangible
property should be located at the place in which its controller resides.
To some, however, this is a “particularly obnoxious example of expan-
sive U.S. claims to regulate domain names,” and it is a poor substitute
45 See id. at 120–21.
46 Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/
help/dndr/udrp/policy (last visited July 14, 2014).
47 See id. at ¶ 4 (“You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceed-
ing in the event that a third party (a ‘complainant’) asserts to the applicable Provider, in
compliance with the Rules of Procedure, that (i) your domain name is identical or confus-
ingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii)
you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) your
domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.”).
48 See CHANDER, supra note 40, at 110. R
49 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012).
50 See Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 WASH. L. REV. 97, 104 (2000).
51 See id. at 106.
52 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (providing that “[t]he owner of a mark may file an
in rem civil action against a domain name”).
53 See id.
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for international coordination.54  That criticism is wrong: someone
needs to control domain names and the United States stepped into
the vacuum.  Perhaps the American position as arbiter in some sense
of ICANN makes sense, but the United States certainly seems to have
foregone the opportunity to regulate in favor of other, more likely
sources.55
The lesson to be drawn from the domain names story is that
sometimes, American neo-imperialism works to satisfy the universal
good.  In other words, some problems require a system-wide solution.
The assignment of domain names was one of those, and the solution
has worked out well.  We now address questions concerning electronic
transactions and specific issues, either procedural or substantive.  In
that analysis, we address the following issues: electronic contracts,
long-arm jurisdiction, interstate defamation, revenge porn, Internet
privacy, interstate taxation, and regulatory jurisdiction.
IV
WHERE THE TRADITIONAL RULES WORK
In this Part, we first discuss topics where the old law provides the
proper method of analysis.  We then discuss areas where cyberspace
might lead us to think about answers to problems that differ from the
digital or paper world.  Finally, we draw conclusions concerning when
“old” or “new” law is appropriate.  We apply our analytical framework
first to electronic contracting because we have developed our analysis
in this area over the course of several years.
Electronic contracts.  Electronic contracting provides an example of
an Internet interaction that is not “everywhere and nowhere.”  Like a
phone conversation, a contract must affect a finite number of people
in that in order to be bound by an agreement, a party must have as-
sented to it.  In order to assent, the party must know the identity of
the person with whom he is dealing.  Internet contracts may raise spe-
cial issues because the lack of spatial constraints allows vendors to of-
fer more, and perhaps more onerous, terms than they do on paper;56
however, they do not raise governance issues.  Choice-of-law analysis
should not depend on the medium of exchange.  Rather, the question
has to be whether there has been adequate notice to both parties.  If
54 Catherine T. Struve & R. Polk Wagner, Realspace Sovereigns in Cyberspace: Problems
with the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 1039 (2002).
55 See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS:
COMMENTARY & MATERIALS, 497–501 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing U.S. attempts to expand
jurisdiction and apply its laws extraterritorially).
56 See NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 125 (2013)
(“Wrap contracts, by their form, permit companies to impose more objectionable terms
than paper contracts of adhesion.”).
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that notice has been given, then the result should be the same under
any form of analysis.
In a series of annual surveys published in The Business Lawyer
from 2005 to 201057 we examined the law of electronic contracting.
When we began those surveys, many scholars and courts believed that
special rules should be adopted for electronic contracting.  In particu-
lar, concepts such as “clickwrap” and “browsewrap” were thought to
require special rules, rules that were separate from the general con-
tract law that we teach students and which can be found in the Con-
tracts Restatements and the Uniform Commercial Code.58  The push
for special rules in the “wrap” area, especially by academics, was so
strong that the American Law Institute (ALI) even convened a group
to suggest “principles” that might govern software transactions.59  This
project necessarily examined Internet contracting because the rise in
computer use by individuals in the waning years of the twentieth cen-
tury and the early years of the twenty-first century led to two parallel
developments: the transfer, by way of standard form terms, of com-
puter programs designed for individual use, and the use of the In-
ternet to enter into bargained-for relationships.60  As time went on,
software vendors delivered their standard terms not in a shrink-
wrapped box containing a plastic disk, but over the Internet by a click-
wrap agreement accompanying downloaded software.  We were dubi-
ous of the argument that the ordinary rules of contracting did not
control e-contracts.
Events have proven us right.  In particular, the ALI Principles of
Software Contracts have been (overwhelmingly) ignored by the courts,61
and basic contract principles have won the day.  Internet “exceptional-
ism” lost out to the law of contract that had been hammered out over
the centuries.  Today, it is quite clear that the vast majority of online
agreements present problems that differ little from those presented
by paper or oral agreements.  Even electronic contracts between par-
ties in two different countries do not raise unique issues.  A person
negotiating by phone or by fax trusts that the voice, phone number,
or signature belongs to a known party.  Purely electronic verification is
more difficult, but the problem is one of trust, which exists any time
two parties negotiate in any environment other than the face-to-face
environment.  In the paper world, notaries serve a verification pur-
57 Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Electronic Contracting Cases 2009–2010,
66 BUS. LAW. 175 (2010); Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Electronic Contracting
Cases 2008–2009, 65 BUS. LAW. 317, 317 n.1 (2009) (listing the previous surveys).
58 See Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 20, at 454–55. R
59 See id. at 474.
60 See id. at 454.
61 See id. at 491 (noting that “the American Law Institute’s project, Principles of Software
Contracts, met with a lackluster response”).
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pose.  They can do so in the electronic world as well, and there are
initiatives on the national level62 to modernize and simplify notarial
verification and attestation of signatures.  A similar international initi-
ative is desirable.  To be sure, occasionally an agreement will present
different problems; but those situations are so rare that they deserve
no special category.
That is not to say that basic common law concepts control every-
thing.63  As we pointed out in a recent article, there are many things
that those concepts do not adequately address.64  We gave as examples
privacy policies, the application of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, and intelligent agents.65  We believe, however, that eternal veri-
ties generally hold true, and that the underlying everyday law that
existed before cyberspace was invented controls most everyday trans-
actions, except for those few situations where special rules are neces-
sary because of the unique properties of cyberspace.
Long-arm jurisdiction.  The cyber world certainly raises many ques-
tions involving multistate problems, problems that American lawyers
generally place under the heading of long-arm jurisdiction.  For a
while it looked as though long-arm jurisdiction involving the Internet
also would develop a set of special rules, rules different from those
found in electronic transactions.  There were two main categories of
cases that led to that concern—interstate contracting and Internet
defamation.  After some fumbling and hesitation, the courts eventu-
ally decided that new rules were not necessary to deal with the online
world.
Courts seemed befuddled at first with cases involving jurisdic-
tional questions involving contracts concluded over the Internet.  The
leading case for many years was Zippo,66 a case where the judge was so
confused that he chose to ignore long-standing Supreme Court prece-
dent and create a new and separate world of long-arm jurisdiction for
62 See REVISED UNIFORM LAW ON NOTARIAL ACTS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS-
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 2010, available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/
docs/notarial_acts/rulona_final_10.pdf.
63 See generally Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 20, at 457–58, 496 (discussing how R
efforts to change the common law failed because “contracts for information . . . need[ed] a
different law from that applied to all other agreements”).
64 See id. at 480–87 (discussing how the common law must be creatively used and
adapted to meet the changing conditions posed by electronic contracts).
65 See id. at 481–87.
66 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). Zippo
adopted a sliding-scale approach to the Internet jurisdiction problem, even though that
approach had been soundly rejected years earlier by the Supreme Court in Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).  Although profoundly wrong on its
face, the Zippo opinion was routinely cited as authoritative for many years.
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the Internet.67  For some mysterious reason, Zippo became a must-cite
in long-arm Internet cases, but it quickly became a de rigeur cite that
was ignored as soon as it was mentioned.68 Zippo was typical of cases
involving online transactions fifteen or twenty years ago.  The judges
did not understand the Internet and groped mightily in their opin-
ions with an effort to understand it (no doubt aided by law clerks who
tried to bring their bosses into the modern world).69  About a dozen
years ago, courts began to feel comfortable with the modern world,
and the decisions involving the Internet assumed a much more realis-
tic flavor.
There was no good reason for this confusion.  Although the Su-
preme Court has never expressly addressed the question of online ju-
risdiction, courts had long dealt with problems involving similar
transactions in the analog world.  Perhaps the most common analogy
was to book-catalog sales, a problem that the courts had long ago re-
solved in a satisfactory doctrinal fashion.70  Eventually, however, the
courts in Internet jurisdiction cases signed off on the analogies that
were familiar to them.71  Long-arm jurisdiction involving the Internet,
67 Zippo distinguished between passive and active websites, a not-bad analysis, but also
adopted a sliding-scale approach which directly conflicted with the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
68 Perhaps the leading case rejecting the Zippo line of reasoning is ALS Scan, Inc. v.
Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002).  The ALS Scan decision does not
reject the framework proposed in Zippo; it actually used the Zippo framework as a starting
point for its own analysis:
Drawing on the requirements for establishing specific jurisdiction, . . .
which requires purposeful conduct directed at the State and that the plain-
tiff’s claims arise from the purposeful conduct, we adopt today the model
developed in [Zippo].
. . . .
Thus, adopting and adapting the Zippo model, we conclude that a State
may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power over a person
outside of the State when that person (1) directs electronic activity into the
State, (2) with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other inter-
actions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person within the
State, a potential cause of action cognizable in the State’s courts.
Id. at 713–14.  According to Westlaw, Zippo has eighty-one instances of negative treatment,
with Howard v. Missouri Bone and Joint Center, Inc., 869 N.E.2d 207 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), being
perhaps the most negative.
69 We sympathize: one of us was a law clerk who tried long ago to educate a judge
about modern physics in a patent case.
70 See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992) (finding that Quill
Corp. had a presence in North Dakota where it sold equipment through catalogues and
advertisements).
71 See, e.g., Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003)
(using a sliding scale approach for Internet-based firms); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen
Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a state has personal juris-
diction when a firm’s website “specifically intend[s] [to] interact[ ] with residents of the
state”); Mink v. AAAA Dev., LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that personal
jurisdiction is inappropriate where a nonresident defendant merely establishes a passive
website that does nothing more than advertise on the Internet).
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in short, does not provide problems that differ in substance (and solu-
tion) from those encountered in the real world.  Some have suggested
that both the permanence and worldwide distribution of the World
Wide Web might create a need for special jurisdictional rules.72  That
has not been the case, however, and no special rules have been
needed for online problems.73  This does not mean, of course, that
similar fact patterns will always be resolved in similar fashion.  It does
mean, however, that the lines of analysis will be similar.
Interstate defamation.  What happens when someone in State A de-
fames someone in State B using the Internet?  This too does not pre-
sent novel legal problems.  The worry in the area is that a defendant
will be held amenable to personal jurisdiction for a defamatory publi-
cation in a jurisdiction that has little contact with the defendant.  An
early and controversial case where this was the central issue was Dow
Jones & Co. v. Gutnick.74  There, Barron’s Online, a subsidiary of Dow
Jones, had published a story, available online, that led to a defamation
action in Australia, where the plaintiff lived.  Many commentators
thought it unfair that the defendant, an American-based company,
could be forced to travel half a world to defend a publication that did
not target Australia.75
But that problem also has a print analog.  After all, the problem
of jurisdiction with the publication of a defamatory statement in a
state where the defendant had little presence had been recognized as
long ago as 1964 in the famous case of New York Times v. Sullivan.76
The problem is the same today.  The analog version of the New York
Times or The Economist is distributed all over the world; why should the
digital distribution of the paper lead to a different resolution?  As the
Australian High Court wrote in Gutnick:
[T]he spectre which Dow Jones sought to conjure up in the present
appeal, of a publisher forced to consider every article it publishes
on the World Wide Web against the defamation laws of every coun-
72 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123–24 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
73 See, e.g., Neogen Corp., 282 F.3d at 889  (applying the minimum-contacts test, which
asks whether a corporation “purposely avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum State”) (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
74 (2002) 210 CLR 575 (Austl.).
75 See id. at 654.
76 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  The New York Times had 394 copies of the print edition that
contained the alleged libel. SUSAN DUDLEY GOLD, NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. SULLIVAN: FREE-
DOM OF THE PRESS OR LIBEL? 18 (2007).  The Supreme Court did not address the jurisdic-
tional issue, but in holding for the defendants on other grounds, it inferentially upheld the
propriety of long-arm jurisdiction in situations where jurisdiction was similarly questiona-
ble.  The Court eventually soundly repudiated that idea in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
465 U.S. 770 (1984).  The problem—publication in a distant forum—is closely related to
cyberspace jurisdiction.
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try from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe is seen to be unreal when it is
recalled that in all except the most unusual of cases, identifying the
person about whom material is to be published will readily identify
the defamation law to which that person may resort.77
Justice Kirby discussed the fact that the Internet presented a new
technology.78
Generally speaking, it is undesirable to express a rule of the com-
mon law in terms of a particular technology.  Doing so presents
problems where that technology is itself overtaken by fresh develop-
ments.  It can scarcely be supposed that the full potential of the
Internet has yet been realised.  The next phase in the global distri-
bution of information cannot be predicted.  A legal rule expressed
in terms of the Internet might very soon be out of date.79
In short, new technologies must give way to old legal rules unless a
good reason appears for not doing so.
The Gutnick case created a lot of concern among commentators
about liability for allegedly defamatory publications that have been
“published” in a remote forum.80  That leads to the question of why
American authors should be concerned about potential liability in
those circumstances.  There are three reasons.  First, the contact with
the foreign jurisdiction may be only incidental (that, of course, is the
nature of the Internet); but Sullivan teaches us that incidental contact
does not preclude the assertion of jurisdiction in defamation actions.
Second, the foreign jurisdiction may not provide adequate procedural
protections for First Amendment claims.  Again, cases such as Sullivan
and Gutnick make clear that insignificant contacts with the forum can
still lead to a proper assertion of personal jurisdiction, at least if the
defendant has been defamed there.
That leaves us with choice-of-law with respect to the enforcement
of judgments.  Here Congress has acted and acted appropriately.  For
the last twenty years, American courts have struggled with the ques-
tion of whether defamation judgments entered abroad should be en-
forced in this country, even though the courts in the country where
the judgment was rendered do not accord the same level of protec-
77 Gutnick, 210 CLR at 609.
78 See id. at 627 (“Viewed in one way, the Internet is not simply an extension of past
communications technology.  It is a new means of creating continuous relationships in a
manner that could not previously have been contemplated.”).
79 Id. at 631.
80 See generally Eric Barendt, Jurisdiction in Internet Libel Cases, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 727,
728–31 (2006) (discussing the Gutnick decision); Peter Bartlett, Gutnick Shows Need for New
International Jurisdictional Principles, 20 COMM. LAW. 16, 16–17 (2003) (discussing the impli-
cations of the Gutnick decision).
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tion to speech that American courts would.81  Those cases have gener-
ally involved print media, and the courts that were asked to enforce
the foreign judgments resolutely have refused to do so.82
Although the law seemed well settled, Congress in 2012 felt the
need to weigh in with the SPEECH Act.83  That law basically codified
the emergent common-law rule that an American court would not en-
force a judgment from abroad where the defendant was not accorded
free speech protections similar to those that it would have received in
an American tribunal.84  The lower courts have had no problem apply-
ing the SPEECH Act to the cyber world.  In Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. v.
Handshoe,85 for example, the Fifth Circuit applied the SPEECH Act to
a defamation action involving an online blog that allegedly injured
the plaintiff in Nova Scotia.  Plaintiff recovered a judgment for defa-
mation in Nova Scotia and sought to enforce it in Louisiana.  The
Fifth Circuit applied the SPEECH Act and denied enforcement.86
What is interesting here for our purposes is that Congress codi-
fied a solution applicable to online problems that had already been
reached by courts dealing with print-based questions.  But the
SPEECH Act was not superfluous.  Given our very strong tradition of
protecting speech, there is much to be said for federal action to en-
sure a uniform national (and protective) result.  On the other hand,
the SPEECH Act is not an Internet-specific solution, for it applies to
all defamation actions, online or not.  Once again, the digital world
had little new to offer the print world.
V
NEW PROBLEMS—WHERE THE TRADITIONAL RULES
DON’T WORK
That observation, however, does not solve problems where the
common law result ends in less-than-optimal solutions.  Or, to put it
somewhat differently, there are problems that need a national (or
even international) solution.  Assuming there is a problem that needs
to be resolved, where should the solution lie?  In other words, if the
81 See, e.g., Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 251 (Md. 1997) (refusing to en-
force a libel judgment entered against a British paper which did not comport with Ameri-
can First Amendment protections).
82 See, e.g., id. (refusing to enforce a foreign judgment).
83 Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage
(SPEECH) Act, 28 U.S.C. § 4102 (2012).
84 See id. (“[A] domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for
defamation unless the domestic court determines that (A) the defamation law applied in
the foreign court’s adjudication provided at least as much protection for freedom of
speech and press in that case as would be provided by the first amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States . . . .”).
85 729 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2013).
86 Id. at 491–94.
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traditional rules do not work, who and what should replace them?  We
discuss three examples—revenge porn, Internet privacy, and inter-
state taxation.
Revenge porn.  “Revenge porn” provides the first example.  This
has become a distressingly common problem: one partner takes ex-
plicit nude photos of another partner.87  They split up in a messy ar-
rangement; the aggrieved party then posts sexually explicit pictures of
the other on the Internet often leading to negative treatment of the
other party, including, but not limited to, harassment and lost profes-
sional opportunities.88  Who should regulate that posting and under
what standards?
Ordinary tort law does not give a good answer: an action for inva-
sion of privacy or defamation does not solve the problem that the
photos can last forever and certainly can be downloaded and redis-
tributed by anyone who sees them.  Thus, although the award of dam-
ages in a tort action might be satisfying to the plaintiff, she probably
would prefer to have the pictures removed from the Internet entirely.
Although that could probably be done under section 230 of the Com-
munications Decency Act,89 in our cyber world, that is a bit like lock-
ing the barn door after the horses have left.  A better answer would be
to make sure the pictures are never posted in the first place.
So what should be the answer?  First, if we assume that tort dam-
ages are an inadequate remedy, then the logical answer is to make the
posting of revenge porn a crime, a classification that carries with it
significant deterrent value.  But this answer raises the question of leg-
islative jurisdiction.  Can State A make criminal the conduct that oc-
curs in State B (the posting of the pictures) and harms a resident of
A?  And given the ubiquity of the Internet, do we even know where
any of this “takes place”?  Can we even tell from where the photos
were posted?90  Additionally, what if State B takes a contrary, free
speech–protective approach and legislates to ensure that such a post-
ing is legal?
This is a problem that surely needs a national solution, like the
SPEECH Act.  Only Congress can solve many of the thorny problems
87 We leave aside here pictures taken of underage persons.
88 See generally Danielle K. Citron, ‘Revenge Porn’ Should be a Crime in U.S., CNN (last
updated Jan. 16, 2014, 3:49 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/opinion/citron-re
venge-porn/; Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 345–46 (2014).
89 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
90 Although I may type an entry in State B, my server is located in State C.  Unless the
seller has asked for a mailing or shipping address, how will it determine what state I am
“in”?  And does the state where the server is located have regulatory jurisdiction over a
seller for that reason alone?
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raised by our federal system and present us with a uniform national
solution that can be enforced everywhere.91
Internet privacy.  Privacy rights provide another example.  Compa-
nies like Facebook and Google collect vast amounts of information on
each of us.92  What rights do we have to limit what those businesses
can do with that information?  Several states have passed some limits
on use of such personal data, but that seems to be an unsatisfactory
solution.93  The reasons are much the same as those set forth in the
discussion of revenge porn, but again there is a hurdle: does Facebook
know what state I am in when I post on Facebook?  My IP address only
tells Facebook where my server is located.  If I am using a large In-
ternet e-mail provider such as Gmail or Hotmail, Google simply can-
not tell what state has an interest in protecting my privacy.  So, how
does my privacy get protected?
Perhaps there are ways for Facebook to learn my protected per-
sonal information, but they might well prove unduly burdensome and
costly, and therefore trigger the dormant Commerce Clause concerns
Justice Curtis worried about so long ago in Cooley v. Board of Wardens.94
Once again, this is the type of problem that demands a national, uni-
form solution; one that will benefit both the consumer and the com-
pany collecting the data.
But what if Congress cannot agree on a solution?  Then we have a
problem, leading to a hodge podge of state laws that may well conflict
with one another and cause recurring dormant Commerce Clause
problems.  Perhaps a Uniform Act would be more successful, but such
things take a long time.  Here, pretty clearly, the need is for national
legislation.
91 A related problem involves the posting of damaging personal information.  Due to
free speech concerns, both state and federal governments have been hesitant to regulate
this behavior.  In 2013, however, California took a big step toward such regulation when it
passed a bill protecting children in the state from their own online blunders.  The Califor-
nia law requires that all websites, online services and mobile applications where a Califor-
nia minor is registered, have an “eraser button” that allows children and teens to remove
information that they posted and now regret posting.  James Steyer, Oops! Button Lets Kids
Remove Posts They Regret, CNN (last updated Sept. 26, 2013, 10:44 AM), http://www.cnn.
com/2013/09/26/opinion/steyer-california-eraser-button-law/.  Although the law allows
for removal of information posted by the individual children themselves, it does not ex-
tend to information that has been posted by third parties.  Still, this is a step in the right
direction, and we hope it will lead to action by Congress, the appropriate body to regulate
this field.
92 See Ashlee Vance, Facebook’s Is Bigger Than Yours, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Aug. 23,
2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-08-23/facebooks-is-bigger-than-yours;
Robert Epstein, Google’s Gotcha, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 10, 2013), http://www.
usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/05/10/15-ways-google-monitors-you.
93 See Somini Sengupta, No U.S. Action, So States Move On Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/technology/no-us-action-so-states-move-
on-privacy-law.html?ref=onlineprivacyregulation.
94 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
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Interstate taxation.  Tax provides a third example.  Today, cities
and states are experiencing fiscal distress to a degree unknown since
the Great Depression.95  Sales taxes provide an important source of
revenue for cities and states.96  The proliferation of online commerce
has made an enormous dent in sales tax collection, however.97  The
Supreme Court has held that a state can require a retailer to collect
and pay a sales tax only if that retailer has a “substantial nexus” with
that state.98  As a result, an Internet retailer has no obligation to col-
lect sales tax on a purchase made by a resident of a state in which the
retailer has no physical presence, either in the form of a bricks-and-
mortar store or a sales force in the buyer’s state.99  Although state laws
require online purchasers (and offline purchasers who buy goods out-
of-state) to remit a use tax to the state in which the goods will be used,
enforcement of these laws is notably lax.100
Reeling from the loss of sales tax revenue, some states have en-
acted legislation redefining “substantial nexus” for sales tax collection
purposes.  The most famous example is that of New York, which in
2008 imposed what is widely referred to as an “Amazon Tax.”101
Under New York tax law, an out-of-state seller is required to collect a
sales tax if that seller enters into an agreement with a New York resi-
dent under which that resident refers potential customers to the
seller, “by a link on an internet website or otherwise.”102  The New
York Court of Appeals has upheld the tax;103 and in December 2013,
95 Several municipalities, including most notably Detroit, have taken the rare step of
filing for bankruptcy in the past few years. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance
in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 406–07 (2014).
96 Timothy R. Hurley, Curing the Structural Defect in State Tax Systems: Expanding the Tax
Base to Include Services, 61 MERCER L. REV. 491, 492 (2010) (“In 2008 states collected $240.4
billion in general sales tax, which was less than the $279.1 billion states collected in per-
sonal income tax.”).
97 See Robert W. Wood, 10 Remarkable Facts About Online Sales Tax, FORBES (Apr. 24,
2013, 1:37 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/04/24/10-remarkable-
facts-about-online-sales-tax/ (reporting that state governments rely on sales and use taxes
for a third of their revenue, local governments for just over eleven percent of their reve-
nue, and that lost tax revenue from Internet sales was estimated at over $11 billion in
2012).
98 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992).
99 See id. at 315 (noting that a vendor’s use of a “small sales force, plant, or office” in
the taxing state often determines whether that state may impose a sales or use tax on a
vendor).
100 See Overview of E-Commerce Selling Issues, 27 CORP. COUNSEL’S Q. 716, 771–72 (2011).
101 See James G.S. Yang, Amazon Tax Under Challenge, 27 J. ST. TAX’N 37, 37 (2009); see
also Adam Liptak, Justices Pass on Tax Case from Online Merchants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/03/business/new-york-ruling-on-sales-tax-collection-by-
online-retailers-will-stand.html?_r=0 (noting a Supreme Court decision to uphold the levy-
ing of New York sales taxes on Internet retailers).
102 N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 1101(b)(8)(vi), 1131(1) (McKinney 2008).
103 Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation and Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 627
(N.Y. 2013).
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the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear Amazon’s appeal of that
ruling.104
Online vendors may truly be “everywhere and nowhere,” thus ne-
cessitating a fresh look at how they are treated under the tax laws.
The history of the sales tax cases reflects the evolutionary nature of
technology and illustrates that online sales are just the most recent
point on a spectrum whose earlier points included catalog sales made
by mail order and telephone order.  The Supreme Court saw the sub-
stantial nexus test as a Commerce Clause mandate; under the Com-
merce Clause, a state may not place an undue burden on interstate
commerce.105
The world today, however, is substantially different from the
world that existed in 1992, when the Supreme Court decided Quill v.
North Dakota.  The business environment in 1992 was in turn different
from that in 1967, when the Court had held in National Bellas Hess,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue that a state could not require a vendor to
collect a use tax when that vendor’s only connection with the state was
by mail or common carrier.106  In 1967, the Court stressed that requir-
ing an out-of-state vendor to keep abreast of the tax rules in the
thousands of American taxing jurisdictions was too great a burden to
impose on an entity that received no protection from the taxing juris-
diction.107  By 1992, significant technological changes had occurred, a
point noted both by the North Dakota Supreme Court in the opinion
taken to the Supreme Court in Heitkamp v. Quill108 and by the dissent-
ing opinion in Quill v. North Dakota.109  By 1992, computers had made
it easier both for companies to comply with the myriad state and local
tax laws,110 and for buyers to place orders with sellers.111  Ultimately,
however, the Court in Quill v. North Dakota maintained the physical
presence requirement and punted the responsibility for changing that
rule to Congress.112  It will shock no one to learn that Congress has
maintained a deafening silence on the subject.
The solution.  As we stress above, the Internet is a communications
platform.  In the realm of sales and advertising, the communications
medium matters.  When Bellas Hess and Quill were decided, a vendor
had to spend time and money in order to advertise in other jurisdic-
104 Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Declines Case On Making Online Retailers Collect Sales
Taxes, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2013, at A1.
105 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
106 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
107 See id. at 759–60.
108 See Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 213 (N.D. 1991).
109 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 328, 332 (1992) (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
110 See Heitkamp, 470 N.W.2d at 213.
111 Quill, 504 U.S. at 328 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
112 See id. at 317–18.
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tions.  A vendor could do so by mailing paper catalogs, by purchasing
television advertising time, or by placing an advertisement in newspa-
pers.  All of these methods cost money.  Today, it costs no more to
advertise in fifty states than it costs to advertise in one; the entire In-
ternet-accessed population of the United States (and the world) can
be reached by one website.
Although the Court in Bellas Hess and Quill was reluctant to place
burdens on companies that received little benefit from the states in
which they made sales, today that burden is minimal due to the so-
phistication of computer programs that can determine, calculate, and
remit taxes, and whose corporate owners benefit from the wonderful
ability to reach the entire United States population through one web-
site.  Moreover, Internet commerce is limiting state tax revenue in two
ways: by reducing the number of taxable sales and by contributing to
the death of local business.113  Does the removal of cost and spatial
constraints change the legal nature of the transaction?  No, a bricks-
and-mortar sale of goods is no more or less a sale of goods than an
Internet sale.  The removal of these constraints, however, has made
physical presence irrelevant to both buyers and sellers.  As a result,
buyers may be just as likely to order a book from Amazon as they are
to drive a mile to the nearest Barnes & Noble.  This irrelevance inures
to the great benefit of online vendors, rendering the burden of tax
compliance less onerous.
There is much commentary to the effect that online sales hurt
local bricks-and-mortar stores.114  There has also been counter com-
mentary to the effect that the suspension of the sales tax on Internet
sales is needed to foster the fledgling industry of e-commerce.115
These are issues that no state can resolve on its own.  Neither do they
require an international solution.  But a national solution addressing
all problems can only be handled by Congress.  Alas, Congress has
failed to address the issue (surprising no one).
113 See Liptak, supra note 101 (“Brick-and-mortar companies often complain that they R
are put at a competitive disadvantage when they are required to collect sales taxes and
online companies are not.”).
114 See Kathleen McHugh & Oren Teicher, Yes, Small Business Wants Online Giants to
Collect Sales Tax, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK., Nov. 22, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/arti
cles/2013-11-22/yes-small-business-wants-online-giants-to-collect-sales-tax; see also Liptak,
supra note 101 (noting bricks-and-mortar companies’ objections to the tax-exempt status of R
online companies).
115 See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., Thinking Straight About the Taxation of Electronic Com-
merce: Tax Principles, Compliance Problems, and Nexus, 16 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 115, 124 (2002)
(“One line of reasoning might be characterized as an ‘infant industry’ argument: that e-
commerce should experience a period of tax exemption in order to allow it to ‘get on its
feet.’”).  Large Internet retailers like Amazon now often support taxes on Internet transac-
tions as a way of entrenching their market power. See Tim Worstall, Amazon’s in Favour of
the Online Sales Tax Bill Now, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2013, 10:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/timworstall/2013/10/26/amazons-in-favour-of-the-online-sales-tax-bill-now/.
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VI
REGULATORY JURISDICTION
A. From Us to Them
It has been hornbook law, at least since the Aramco decision in
1991, that American statutory law is not to be applied extraterritorially
unless Congress has made clear its intent that such be done.116  That
precept has been reinforced strongly in recent years, especially in the
Kiobel case, where the Court refused to apply the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) extraterritorially.117 Kiobel is of foremost importance because
the ATS had been routinely applied by lower courts and because it
involved human rights.
We know of no attempt by Congress to regulate the foreign ef-
fects of electronic transactions. Aramco and Kiobel make clear, how-
ever, that Congress will have to provide in no uncertain terms for such
a law to have extraterritorial effect.  They also make clear that normal
choice-of-law rules will apply to all transactions.
That in turn raises the question of so-called “f-cubed” litigation,
where a foreign plaintiff sues a foreign defendant in a U.S. court over
matters that happened in a foreign country. (Get it? Foreign, foreign,
foreign.)  The Supreme Court will hear argument this Term in two
cases raising those issues.118  If the Court should restrict the extraterri-
torial reach of American courts in such situations, it will help to rein-
force the lesson from Kiobel and Morrison that the courts of this
country follow Justice Story’s dictum—that “[n]o nation has ever yet
pretended to be the custos morum of the whole world.”119  That is
particularly important in the world of online transactions, given the
possibility that the universality of the e-commerce world will permit
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over many matters that have no
“real” basis for being heard in an American court.  If we are correct in
that prediction, then the Supreme Court will have stepped back from
its apparent ability to assert jurisdiction over most of the cyber
world.120  In other words, although the cyber world permits wide-
spread assertions of jurisdiction under traditional notions of long-arm
jurisdiction, we believe that it is likely that the Court will step back and
say that it has no business here.
116 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
117 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013).
118 Those cases are Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), and Firoe v. Walden,
688 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
119 United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822).  Or, as
the Court of Appeals of New York wrote in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d. 121, 130 (1972),
“Was the New York rule really intended to be manna for the entire world?”
120 This is not the place to venture into choice of law in detail.  But the Supreme Court
has exercised very little control over state choice-of-law decisions, be they on or offline.
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Finally, we get to international assertions of jurisdiction by Ameri-
can courts.  Although the recent trend has been to limit the broad
reach of American personal jurisdiction—both long-arm and gen-
eral,121 that jurisdiction may be exercised so as to limit overbroad
judgments of a foreign court.  In Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le
Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, the court was faced with a French judicial
decision that forbade Yahoo! from publishing ads for Nazi
memorabilia.122  Those ads were illegal in France but not in the
United States.  The decision was to be enforced by potentially ruinous
fines.
Yahoo! then filed suit in federal court—seeking a declaratory
judgment that the orders of the French court could not be enforced
in an American court because it could not comply fully with those
orders, due to technical problems.  The District Court granted the in-
junction, but a badly divided Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that
the case should be dismissed.123  There was not a majority for any rea-
son behind the dismissal—three of the judges found that personal ju-
risdiction over the defendant was lacking, and three more—
constituting a bare majority—believed the case was not yet ripe for
adjudication.  The division on the Ninth Circuit illustrates the im-
mense difficulty of resolving a close-to-intractable problem, a problem
made all the more acute due to the immense importance the French
(and other European) governments place on restricting racist
propaganda.
The problem Yahoo! raises is a perplexing one indeed: How can
an American company determine whether it is complying with an or-
der of a foreign court to refrain from acting in that country in a cer-
tain way?  There is no easy answer to this quandary.  The ideal solution
would be an international agreement, but the contours of that agree-
ment do not leap readily to mind.
B. From Them to Us
The Yahoo! litigation also raises the reverse question: Can a for-
eign country regulate the American electronic world?124  The answer,
of course, is that the foreign country can try to do so, but can it en-
force its orders here?  As we discussed earlier, American courts have
been reluctant to enforce foreign libel judgments.125  The reason is
121 See Linda S. Mullenix, Personal Jurisdiction Stops Here: Cabining the Extraterrito-
rial Reach of American Courts, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series No.
530, at 12, available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2348233.
122 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (en banc).
123 Id. at 1224.
124 We have already touched on this question in our discussion of the Gutnick litiga-
tion. See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text. R
125 See supra notes 75–77. R
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that most of those judgments do not provide enough procedural safe-
guards for First Amendment rights.  In other words, American courts
will assert control over problems that involve significant American in-
terests—here, free speech—and deny recognition if those rights are
not sufficiently protected.
A much more likely form of regulation by external authorities,
however, involves the substance of an ordinary commercial transac-
tion.  Here, our courts are more likely to take a hands-off approach
and defer to the regulatory regime of other jurisdictions.  The Euro-
pean community has long been a leader here.  In 2008, the EU
adopted comprehensive regulations concerning consumer contracts,
regulations which are much more protective of consumers than most
similar American rules.126  By adopting choice-of-law rules that imple-
ment substantive consumer protections that protect both paper and
electronic transactions, the European Union has assumed control of
all consumer transactions in the EU, regardless of what form they as-
sume.  In this respect, the EU tracks the United States: no special rules
are needed for online transactions; rather, the traditional rules (here
legislative) protect all consumers.127
CONCLUSION
This symposium focuses on neo-territorialism in various aspects
of American law.  Our journey through the law that has been applied
to cyber transactions makes quite clear that neither the Supreme
Court nor other U.S. courts have been particularly territorial in their
approach to electronic transactions.  Rather, our courts have focused
on what they know and do best—drawing analogies to well-known ex-
isting law.  Judges have not treated cyber problems as sui generis, a view
that has led them away from expressions of Internet “exceptionalism.”
Nor have Congress or state legislatures become especially territorial in
their approach to the law.128
That does not mean that there are no issues involving electronic
transactions that need to be resolved.  We have discussed revenge
porn and consumer privacy as areas where many believe action is
needed.  Action in either area should take the form of uniform na-
126 See Council Regulation 593/2008, On the Law Applicable to Contractual Obliga-
tions, art. 6, 2008 O.J. (L 177) (specifying that the choice of law in a consumer contract
dispute in the EU will be the law of the country in which the consumer resides).
127 There is a big difference, of course, in the fact that consumer transactions in the
EU are subject to substantive protections; and here they are not protected nearly as well.
128 That the old laws work even in a modern age is vividly demonstrated in Professor
Louise Weinberg’s Essay in this symposium where she shows how the application of tradi-
tional jurisdictional rules would have reached more just results in very recent human rights
litigation. See Louise Weinberg, What We Don’t Talk About When We Talk About Extraterritorial-
ity: Kiobel and the Conflict of Laws, 99 CORNELL. L. REV. 1471 (2014).
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tional rules; that there has been no legislation suggests that no con-
sensus sufficient to spur that action has been developed.  We are
comfortable with that result.
